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Abstract 
There is increasing interest in the use of economic valuation of ecosystem goods and services for a 
wide variety of purposes.  These include relatively familiar uses in project appraisal and more novel 
applications in advocacy, performance tracking and accounting in public and private settings.  
Decision makers who use valuation information need to understand the background, strengths and 
weaknesses of these approaches.  The methods have a strong foundation in economic theory and offer 
a rapidly growing evidence base, improving ability to evaluate a broad range of ecosystem goods and 
services.  Nevertheless, there are theoretical and practical limitations that need to be understood and 
kept in mind when interpreting results.  In this paper, we briefly review the economic valuation 
methods and situate them in their historical and theoretical contexts.  We assess the main critiques, 
attempts at resolving them, and implications for the usefulness of the methods in different contexts.  
We examine the main barriers and opportunities for wider uses of valuation evidence, and draw 
conclusions on the appropriate role of valuation in future, as a tool for aiding reflection and 
deliberation processes. 
 
Keywords: economic valuation; criticisms of economic valuation; stated preference; revealed 
preference; externalities; ecosystem services; policy appraisal; decision support. 
  
4 
 
1 Introduction 
Market systems and economic appraisal methods offer powerful tools for supporting decisions 
about the allocation of scarce resources.  However there are many important aspects of human 
activity that are not fully reflected in market prices, including our impacts on the natural 
world and our dependence on the many valuable goods and services provided by ecosystems.  
With the aim of improving decision-making processes, there is increasing interest from 
research providers, policy makers and private sector decision makers in economic valuation of 
ecosystem goods and services (hereafter referred to as economic valuation). 
A short paper (Ozdemiroglu and Hails, 2016) was drafted using contributions from 
120 research providers and users to answer frequently asked questions about economic 
valuation.  At the same time, a longer review of the concepts and practice was prepared by a 
subset of those contributors.  This article is based on that longer review, and is written for a 
general audience with basic knowledge about economic valuation. It presents a summary of 
the conceptual background and history of economic valuation, an assessment of current 
methods, a discussion of practical applications, a critique of key uncertainties and 
assumptions, and concludes with consideration of barriers and opportunities for future 
developments and uses.  
2 Conceptual background to economic valuation and its history 
Economic valuation has a long history (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010) with roots in 
Pre-classical economics (1650-1750), when ‘land’ was central to economic theory as a 
primary source of wealth (Petty, 1664).  During Classical economics (1750-1875), the 
importance of nature’s services was widely recognised (Malthus, 1853, Marx, 1887), although 
ecology did not exist as a discipline until the late 1800s, and the ‘ecosystem’ concept was not 
introduced until Tansley (1935).  Following the industrial revolution, the significance of the 
environment waned in Neoclassical economic theory (1875 onwards) with attention focused 
on human-made capital and labour.   
The 20th century saw renewed interest in the environmental impacts of economic 
activity, and in the dependence of the economy, and human welfare, on healthy natural 
systems. Pigou (1920) introduced welfare economics and the concept of externality, leading 
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to the development of environmental economics and the foundations of economic valuation 
(notably Hicks, 1939, 1943; Hotelling, 1947; see Pearce, 2002). 
The first important applications came in the 1960s, with valuation of environmental 
resources underpinning new legislation in the USA, in particular the Clean Air (1963) and 
Clean Waters (1972) Acts. Early examples of the methods included Clawson (1959), Davis 
(1963), Clawson and Knetsch (1966) and Ridker (1967). The development and application of 
economic valuation continued through the 1970s and 1980s, for example with progression 
from zonal to individual travel cost models (Brown and Nawas, 1973, Gum and Martin 1974), 
and the development of Contingent Valuation (e.g. Randall et al., 1974) and its subsequent 
adoption in the USA as a means of estimating damages to environmental resources 
(Cummings et al., 1986, Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  In the UK, ‘Blueprint for a Green 
Economy’ (Pearce et al., 1989) and the following White Paper (‘This Common Inheritance’: 
HMSO, 1990) sought formal inclusion of environmental impacts in policy appraisal.  
The 1990s brought continued refinement of valuation methods, for example through 
the introduction of discrete choice experiments and random utility models in stated and 
revealed preference studies (Adamowicz et al., 1994, Boxall et al., 1996, Hanley et al., 1998). 
Nordhaus (1992, 1993) pioneered integrated assessment models linking the global economy, 
energy use and climate change, estimating the value of damages caused by greenhouse gases. 
Alongside the development of environmental economics, dissenting voices (Boulding, 
1966, Meadows et al, 1972, Daly, 1973) led to the emergence of ecological economics, 
treating the economy as a subsystem of the global ecosystem, with a greater focus on systemic 
approaches to the preservation of natural capital, justice and equity, and issues of 
irreversibility and uncertainty (van den Bergh, 2001; Faber, 2008). “Doughnut economics” 
(Raworth, 2018) crystalizes many of these ideas, for example rejecting the focus on GDP 
growth and promoting the circular economy and reducing inequality as key objectives. 
Ecological and environmental economics remain in some ways separate approaches 
(Illge and Schwarze, 2006), though with considerable overlap in terms of both approaches and 
practitioners. For valuation, the main differences have been in how values are combined and 
used to support decision making. However, recent work on valuation methods in ecological 
economics (Irvine et al., 2016; Kenter et al., 2015) has sought to distance itself from 
neoclassical approaches principally by suggesting that many environmental values are social 
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and shared, and are thus formed in response to specific situations, as opposed to being 
associated with the ‘utility functions’ of independent individuals. 
Costanza et al. (1997) combined environmental economics with an ecosystem services 
framework to ‘value’ the world’s ecosystem services at US$33 trillion per year.  The 
Costanza study was theoretically flawed1 in seeking a total value for the ecosystems on which 
all life depends (Fisher et al. (2009) described it as “a serious underestimate of infinity”) but 
successfully raised awareness of the ecosystem services paradigm and non-market valuation, 
shifting them into mainstream debate.  
Ongoing loss of biodiversity and ecosystems was highlighted in studies such as the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005) and various National Ecosystem 
Assessments (including those in the UK: UKNEA 2011 and 2014), with a direct link being 
made to economic losses and decline in human wellbeing. The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity (TEEB)2 has played a global role in “making nature’s values visible”.  The 
European Commission supported TEEB via several projects, including the Cost of Policy 
Inaction study (Braat and ten Brink, 2008) which gave a conservative and partial estimate that 
the global cost of additional biodiversity loss after 2000 would reach 7% of world GDP by 
2050. 
The numbers of papers and projects using ecosystem services have risen dramatically 
and the concept is now ingrained in policy across the world. The European Environment 
Agency (EEA) has led work to develop the Common International Classification of 
Ecosystem Services (CICES)3 and the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) has 
developed the Final Ecosystem Goods and Services Classification System (FEGS-CS)4.  The 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) 
                                       
1 Despite the flaws, the study remains useful, both as an awareness-raising exercise, and through setting a 
baseline for comparisons using consistent methods: a follow up (Costanza et al, 2014) updated the unit values 
and took account of land use/land cover change from 1997-2011, showing a higher total value (due to 
revaluation) but a substantial loss due to land use change. See also the review by Costanza et al (2017). 
2 http://www.teebweb.org/  
3 http://cices.eu/ 
4 https://www.epa.gov/eco-research/final-ecosystem-goods-and-services-classification-system-fegs-cs  
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was set up in 2012 to assess the state of biodiversity and of the ecosystem services it provides 
to society, in response to requests from decision makers5.  
Alongside these developments, a growing number of original economic valuation 
studies, meta-analyses of economic valuation studies (e.g. Brouwer et al., 1999; Brander et 
al., 2011) and economic valuation databases6 has consolidated the evidence base and 
facilitated the transfer of economic value estimates to new contexts (such transfer being 
considered contentious by some: see e.g. Ravenscroft, 2019).  The mainstreaming of 
economic valuation is demonstrated by the development under the environmental 
management systems series International Standards Organisation (ISO) 14000 (the best-
selling standard in the world) of ISO 14007 “Environmental management: Determining 
environmental costs and benefits – Guidance”7 and ISO 140088 “Monetary valuation of 
environmental impacts and related environmental aspects”.  Despite this progress, economic 
valuation of biodiversity remains notoriously difficult: the risks of unintended interpretations 
and undervaluation make it particularly important that both qualitative and quantitative 
narrative is presented as well as what is possible to express in monetary terms. 
2.1 The concept of value in neoclassical economics 
In neoclassical economics, “value” is grounded in utilitarianism, an ethical theory 
traced back to Hume (1751) and Bentham (1789) and with roots in the Greek Hedonist 
philosophers. Utilitarianism holds that the best moral action is the one that maximizes utility. 
Utility in turn can be variously defined, but is generally related to the well-being of sentient 
beings.  In neoclassical economics, only anthropocentric values (including passive and non-
use values) are taken into account.  Non-anthropocentric and intrinsic values, for which we 
have no assessment methods, are excluded, though they may be acknowledged as boundaries 
on economic valuation with respect to our obligations to other beings and objects. 
                                       
5 www.ipbes.net/about  
6 See in particular the Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI) (www.evri.ca), the TEEB valuation 
database (http://es-partnership.org/services/data-knowledge-sharing/ecosystem-service-valuation-database/; de 
Groot et al., 2012), the Envalue database (http://marineecosystemservices.org/explore) and the Marine 
Ecosystem Services Partnership’s (MESP) Valuation Library (http://marineecosystemservices.org/explore). 
7 https://committee.iso.org/sites/tc207sc1/home/projects/ongoing/iso-14007.html  
8 https://committee.iso.org/sites/tc207sc1/home/projects/ongoing/iso-14008.html  
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Human utility is assessed using the framework of expected utility theory (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) following the assumption that individuals act as ‘rational 
utility maximisers’ whose decisions and behaviour stem from preferences accurately 
reflecting their utilities.  Related values are reflected through individual choices under a 
budget constraint, expressed as ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) to secure a gain or avoid a loss, or 
‘willingness to accept’ (WTA) compensation to forgo a gain or tolerate a loss. 
Although based on individuals’ preferences, the Total Economic Value (TEV) 
framework (Figure 1) is not limited to ‘selfish’ values. In addition to values for their own 
direct and indirect uses of goods and services, people often have altruistic preferences for 
others, for future generations (bequest value) and for aspects of the natural world in their own 
right (existence value). These “non-use values” are expressed, for example, via charitable 
donations.  The framework was recently extended by Pascual et al. (2015) to include 
‘insurance’ values, related to uncertainty about outcomes and preferences, and associated 
willingness to pay to mitigate risks, to adapt to risks, or to preserve options to use resources if 
circumstances change. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
2.2 Values in markets 
The use of money and markets allows huge efficiency gains compared with systems of barter 
or directed activities.  Individuals express their preferences via market demands for goods and 
services, and their supply of labour and assets, while firms express values through demand for 
resources and labour, and supply of goods and services.  A well-functioning market enables 
mutually beneficial trades and the market ‘clears’ at a price at which all people willing to 
trade at that price can do so, maximising the economic surplus produced. 
‘General equilibrium’ (Walras, 1877) implies simultaneous clearing of all markets, 
such that the prices in each market represent the opportunity costs9 of the resources used to 
produce the good or service.  Through adjustments of prices in response to supply and 
demand, a full set of perfectly functioning markets would achieve efficient allocation of 
                                       
9 Opportunity cost is the value in ‘next best use’, e.g. switching the resource from production of good A to good 
B. 
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scarce resources, maximising economic surplus, and achieving a ‘Pareto optimum’ in which it 
is not possible to make any person better off without making someone worse off (Pareto, 
1906). There are many possible Pareto optimal equilibria: which one ‘perfect’ markets would 
in theory reach depends on the initial distribution of ‘endowments’ (property rights), and the 
social choice among them is a normative matter of ‘fairness’. 
At the societal level, taxation and redistribution policies can be used to improve 
fairness (see e.g. Hochman and Rodgers, 1969, Stiglitz, 1987).  Individual economic 
appraisals generally apply the Kaldor-Hicks rule (Hicks, 1939, Kaldor, 1939) that a change is 
beneficial if the ‘winners’ could fully compensate the ‘losers’ and still be better off.  But with 
no actual compensation, in practice appraisals allow gains to some people to offset losses to 
others. 
In reality, while market prices guide individual choices, various ‘market failures’ (see 
Bator, 1958) mean they do not always reflect social values, resulting in (Pareto-)inefficient 
outcomes.  Some important failures include those presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Market failures: description, example and possible solutions  
Failure Description Example Possible solutions 
Distortionary 
taxes 
Taxes/subsidies influence 
incentives 
Fossil fuel 
subsidies 
Remove 
Externality / 
missing markets 
Impacts of activities not 
fully considered by actors 
Pollution 
Open access 
Taxes, quotas, standards; 
Clarify property rights 
Imperfect 
competition 
Market power allows price 
manipulation 
OPEC raising 
oil prices 
Antitrust regulations 
Imperfect 
information 
Choices do not reflect 
values 
Asbestos, 
DDT, 
ecosystem 
tipping points 
Research and education, 
precautionary principle 
Labelling, regulations 
For ecosystem goods and services, the main market failure is often externality, 
because many ecosystem goods and services that benefit people are not traded in markets.  
This drives a wedge between market outcomes and socially desirable outcomes.  Policies may 
address such failures in various ways, including changing prices (taxes, subsidies), controlling 
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quantities (quotas, permits) or restricting activities and technologies and activities 
(regulations, bans).  To support policies, and for appraisal (notably cost benefit analysis), one 
useful option is to estimate economic values for non-market goods and services in monetary 
units.  Economic valuation methods seek to extend the scope of economic analysis to consider 
all the consequences of decisions that enter utility and production functions, not only those 
that are traded in markets, allowing comparisons of relative values across impacts, people, 
time, and decisions.   
3 Economic valuation methods  
Values for goods and services traded in markets are generally estimated through observed 
prices, or sometimes econometric estimation of demand curves for non-marginal changes.  
Where there is market failure, prices can be adjusted or estimated to derive ‘shadow prices’ 
that reflect social benefits and costs. 
Where a non-market good is closely related to a market one, proxy values may be 
identified. For example, home-grown or gathered food can be valued using market prices for 
equivalent produce.  Sometimes, statistical analysis can derive ‘production functions’ relating 
changes in some ecosystem function to production of a good or service that can be valued 
(Barbier, 2007). For example, production functions relating air pollution to crop yields 
(market values) and human health (non-market values) estimate air pollution damages in 
mainland China at 5.7-6.6% of GDP (Miao et al, 2017). The primary difficulty is the 
availability of scientific knowledge and/or data for estimating the production function.  
Where market values cannot be used or adjusted, there are two main approaches to 
valuation: revealed preference and stated preference. 
3.1 Revealed preference  
Revealed preference methods analyse relationships between demand for some market goods 
and preferences for related non-market goods/services.  These methods only work if changes 
in provision of the non-market good have an observable impact on the demand for a market 
good.  Examples include property and labour markets (hedonic methods), demand for 
recreation (travel cost), and demand for products that compensate for losses in environmental 
services (averting behaviour). 
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Averting behaviour approaches involve estimating household ‘production functions’ 
that allow calculation of values for risks and disamenities via the expenditures households 
incur to avoid them - for example to avoid exposure to pollution (Bartik, 1988) or risks 
associated with groundwater contamination (Abdalla et al., 1992).  Problems include for 
example joint impacts (e.g. double glazing will impact both noise and thermal comfort), 
‘lumpiness’ in investments and transactions costs (see Courant and Porter, 1981) and 
imperfect information about risks, effectiveness of measures, and the endogeneity of risk 
perceptions (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2018). 
Hedonic pricing has a similar theoretical background (Rosen, 1974).  Common 
applications seek to value environmental quality aspects of housing via statistical analysis of 
property markets (see Boyle and Kiel, 2001). Sale/rental values of properties are modelled as 
a function of property ‘attributes’ including environmental quality (such as noise nuisance 
(Day et al., 2007), air pollution (Smith and Huang, 1993), or proximity to desirable features, 
such as an urban green space (Czembrowski and Kronenberg, 2016) or undesirable features 
such as landfill sites (Hite et al., 2001)). The method only accounts for use values associated 
with occupation of the property and does not cover values to non-residents. The method 
assumes markets are perfectly functioning, though people may have poor knowledge 
regarding both the levels and the impacts of some attributes (e.g. air pollution), and housing 
markets generally have high transactions costs (taxes and moving costs) and may therefore 
respond slowly to changed conditions (Freeman, 1981).  Hedonic wage methods use a similar 
approach to value risks to health/life, via the wage premium for dangerous jobs (Liu et al., 
1997). 
Travel cost methods use costs incurred travelling to and at a site, including the cost of 
time, as a proxy for the price of recreation. This is combined with information about visit 
rates to derive an estimate of the value of recreation at the site.  The main methodological 
concerns include the valuation of travel time (Bockstael et al., 1987), the analysis of multi-site 
and multi-purpose trips, and accounting for substitute sites and activities (Ward and Beal 
2000).  Early applications focused on single sites, but modern methods use Random Utility 
models (Phaneuf and Smith, 2005) focusing on individuals’ choices from a set of alternative 
sites, modelled as a function of site characteristics and individual factors including income 
and travel costs. 
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3.2 Stated preference  
Stated preference methods are based on surveys which create hypothetical markets for 
respondents to express their preferences:10 
 Contingent valuation (CV) asks directly how much respondents are willing to pay to 
secure the change presented, or willing to accept compensation to avoid it11, via open-
ended questions or different forms of bidding formats.  
 Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are based on respondents’ choices for their 
preferred scenario among alternatives. Scenarios are described by different 
combinations of the goods and services in terms of their environmental as well as cost 
attributes, each taking different levels in each scenario. Information on the values that 
people assign to improvements in the different goods and services are indirectly 
inferred from the trade-offs that people are willing to make when choosing their 
preferred alternatives. 
Both CV and DCE formats enable estimation of WTP (or WTA) for the good or service as 
a whole; DCE also allows for the calculation of implicit prices of specific attributes. One 
advantage of stated preference (over revealed preference) methods is that they can elicit 
preferences for scenarios that are yet to occur, therefore providing ex-ante information on 
expected WTP to inform the design of future policies.  Another is the ability to capture non-
use values as well as use values. 
Responses in stated preference surveys may show high sensitivity to factors that 
should not matter (according to economic theory) and/or insensitivity to factors that should. 
Examples of the former are starting-point/anchoring/range biases (Chien et al., 2005, Whynes 
et al., 2004), where the amounts proposed as WTP options in the survey influence the 
responses, and order effects, where the order in which components of the good are valued 
affects overall stated value (Day et al., 2012, Powe and Bateman, 2003). Examples of the 
latter are the failure of the valuation to vary with the scope or quantity of the good (e.g. Powe 
and Bateman, 2004, Veisten et al., 2004). Critics argue that hypothetical questions generate 
                                       
10 Recent reviews of the CV and DCE include Venkatachalam (2004), Hoyos (2010), Kling et al. (2012) and 
Johnston et al. (2017). 
11 Rare in practice since the framing of compensation for accepting damages tends to trigger protest responses. 
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hypothetical, invalid responses (Hausman, 2012) and WTP from surveys often exceeds WTP 
with real payments (Little and Berrens, 2004, Fifer et al., 2014).  Respondents may have 
strategic motives to misreport WTP, to make a ‘protest’ bid (false zero or inflated WTP) or to 
refuse to express preference, not because they are indifferent, but because they reject the 
valuation scenario, the implied property right, or the valuation approach (Jorgensen et al., 
1999, Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2010).  Substantial research has helped develop strategies to limit 
these potential biases through careful study design and testing (Carson and Groves, 2007, 
Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006, Cummings and Taylor, 1999, Atkinson et al., 2012). 
Stated preference methods can assess the WTP for an environmental improvement or 
the willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for deterioration.  WTA can be greater than 
WTP for an equivalent change due to income effects, but in empirical studies this discrepancy 
tends to be greater than theory predicts (Brown and Gregory, 1999, Horowitz and McConnell, 
2002).  Behavioural explanations such as an endowment effect or loss aversion (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991) and ambiguity of the transaction and expected regret (Loomes and Sugden, 
1982) have been proposed. None of these concepts have sufficiently explained the differences 
observed in empirical studies.  The difficulties of deriving unbiased estimates of WTA mean 
that WTP is almost always used, though this underestimates WTA and remains controversial. 
4 Valuation in practice 
There are many applications for valuation evidence that may call for different methods, 
coverage, accuracy and research expenditure, and may evoke different ethical and practical 
objections (see e.g. Beaumont et al., 2018, Gómez-Baggethun and Barton, 2013, Laurans et 
al., 2013).  The article by Curnow in this special issue (2019) is a summary of the current use 
of economic evidence in environmental policy by the UK government. In general, 
applications include: 
 Demonstrating economic value, advocacy 
 Project/policy appraisal, impact assessment 
 Prioritising investments 
 Demonstrating ‘Value for Money’, seeking funding  
 Informing planning/location decisions 
 Monitoring/review of decisions 
 Environmental accounting  
14 
 Informing pricing decisions: fees, payments, compensation 
Valuation is sometimes attempted for whole systems (e.g. WTP to protect a specific 
natural area).  In general however an attempt is first made to quantify environmental impacts 
as changes in physical values (such as tonnes of carbon storage, crop production, flood risks) 
and then to ascribe an economic value for each physical unit.  There is also an important 
distinction between stocks of ‘assets’ (e.g. total carbon stored) and flows of goods and 
services (e.g. carbon sequestered per year) (Ozdemiroglu, 2019).  
For most practical purposes, value transfer is used to draw values from existing studies 
to use as proxies in analysis. This is cheaper and quicker than conducting original studies.  
The simplest type, unit transfer, directly applies an estimate of value made for one site or 
location to another. A more sophisticated approach uses a value function describing the 
relationship between value and key environmental and population factors influencing it.  
Meta-analysis can be used to estimate a composite value function based on several studies. 
Value estimates based on careful meta-analysis of several good-quality studies may produce 
narrower confidence intervals than a single study, provided the meta-analysis take sufficient 
account of variability in socioeconomic and biophysical factors (Schmidt et al., 2016). 
The most familiar and widespread application is project appraisal using cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) (see Boardman et al., 2017, OECD, 2018).  CBA compares all the benefits 
and costs of project/policy options that can be valued in monetary terms.  These are 
discounted to convert future values to present-day equivalents, then aggregated to give 
expected12 net present value.  CBA can compare options for a specific decision, and 
rank/prioritise spending options in terms of their net present value, benefit: cost ratio, or 
internal rate of return.  Extensive official guidance for appraisal exists in many jurisdictions, 
including the UK (HMT, 2018), the EU (EC, 2015), US (EPA, 2010) and so on. Guidance for 
value transfer is also available (e.g. eftec, 2010 as formal guidance from UK Defra). 
Discounting can be justified through social time-preference (people value benefits 
now more than benefits later) and/or returns to investment (projects should bring greater 
social return than alternative uses for funds) (see HMT, 2018).  The choice of discount rate is 
                                       
12 Assuming calculable risks about future costs and benefits; other statistical treatments 
are also possible. 
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however hard to justify objectively (Arrow et al., 2012) but has great influence over results 
(Weitzman, 2007).  National governments and international institutions typically have a 
standard rate to ensure consistent discounting across all public sector appraisals (European 
Commission, 2015; HMT, 2018).  Some argue that discounting is inappropriate for long-term, 
significant environmental changes (Stern, Peters et al., 2006, Saez and Requena, 2007, Stern 
and Taylor, 2007, Faccioli, Hanley et al., 2016) because the standard discount rates of a few 
percent result in huge discounting of long-term impacts – which for climate policy, for 
example, could justify a “wait and see” approach.  Some advocate declining or hyperbolic 
discount rates (Kirby, 1997), others a low constant rate. Heal and Millner (2014) argue that 
there are no objectively correct discount rates, just different ethical positions that need to be 
weighted: climate policy analysis “becomes an exercise in social choice” that requires 
aggregating “the diverse preferences of individuals into a representative discount rate”.  At 
any rate, CBA should consider the impact of the discount rate on the analysis, including 
sensitivity analysis using different discount rates and explicit discussion of impacts in 
different time periods (HMT, 2018)13  
Although valuation is primarily used in public sector settings, there is increasing 
uptake in the private sector, for example for determining customer priorities, assessing 
impacts and dependencies on natural systems, communication and performance tracking 
including natural capital and ecosystem accounting.  Initiatives include, for example, The 
Natural Capital Project14, the World Business Council on Sustainable Development15, and the 
Natural Capital Coalition16 at the international level, and water company business planning in 
the UK.  Wales (2014), Bowe and van der Horst (2015), Dickie et al., (this issue) and Koshy 
et al., (this issue) give examples of how and why private organisations use economic 
valuation for natural capital accounting.  
                                       
13 The 2018 version of the HM Treasury Green Book introduces a ‘health discount rate’ starting at 1.5% and 
declining over time (compared to social discount rate starting at 3.5%). The difference is due to the exclusion of 
‘wealth effect’, or real per capita consumption growth element of the discount rate when discounting health 
effects (HMT, 2018, p 103). 
14 www.naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu     
15 www.wbcsd.org  
16 www.naturalcapitalcoalition.org  
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5 Critiques of valuation 
Using market values to account for goods and services traded in markets, including ecosystem 
goods (food, timber etc.), is relatively uncontroversial. But use of economic values for non-
marketed services such as clean air provision or biodiversity protection has been criticised on 
many fronts (Table 2). 
Table 2: Valuation assumptions, problems and resolutions 
Assumption Problem? Generalisation Resolution? 
Individuals’ 
preferences strongly 
correlated with 
welfare 
Sometimes false (e.g. 
drug addiction), often 
dubious (e.g. myopic 
preferences and regret: 
Hoch and 
Loewenstein, 1991). 
Democratic societies 
allow wide freedom of 
choice under rules to 
curb excesses, 
encourage saving etc. 
Recognise TEV 
focuses on 
individual 
preference, 
consider other 
moral decision 
rules in 
deliberative 
processes. 
Individuals have 
information and 
ability to have stable, 
well-formed 
preferences they 
express through 
decisions 
People have “bounded 
rationality” (March 
and Simon, 1958), 
construct preferences 
(Slovic, 1995), 
especially for 
hypothetical decisions, 
unfamiliar 
goods/services  
Affects other 
methods. Market 
institutions consistent 
with assumptions, 
with limits 
(advertising, trade 
descriptions…).   
Cognitive limits 
may support 
procedural 
rationality (Laville, 
2000).  Reduce 
bias via 
information, 
thinking time, 
deliberation. 
Interpersonal 
comparability of 
utility 
Identical indicators of 
benefit to different 
individuals may 
represent different 
levels of human 
welfare (d'Aspremont 
Affects any system 
(including voting 
systems), not limited 
to monetary units. 
Practical option is 
to act ‘as if’ 
comparisons 
reliable, and use 
income weighting. 
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and Gevers, 2002). 
Values constrained by 
ability to pay 
Raw value estimates 
assume that income 
distributions are 
desirable/fair 
Tax/benefit policies 
redistribute incomes 
so actual distributions 
partly reflect 
democratic processes. 
Income weighting 
to adjust values in 
transfer/appraisal. 
Smooth, continuous 
value functions 
Non-linearities, 
threshold effects and 
areas of highly 
inelastic demand / 
rapidly changing 
values 
Small-scale, marginal 
assessments less 
likely to suffer than 
large-scale, major 
changes. 
Valuation less 
useful for critical 
natural capital or 
potentially 
catastrophic 
changes. 
Data gaps in scientific 
understanding and 
valuation evidence  
No valuation or 
appraisal can be 
complete and accurate 
Applies to all 
methods: use range of 
values, sensitivity 
analysis, clear 
statements of gaps. 
Valuation/appraisal 
are aids to 
deliberation, not 
“the answer”. 
Optimism bias: 
tendency to 
underestimate future 
costs and 
overestimate benefits 
CBA likely to be 
biased (see Mackie 
and Preston, 1998).  
More about physical 
outcomes and timings 
than valuation 
methods. 
Recognise and 
adjust for optimism 
(or ‘pessimism’) 
bias. 
Aggregating individual preferences to produce a well-characterised social preference 
ordering leads to tractable social value functions, with obvious practical advantages for 
decision support.  Hence, the neoclassical approach dominates welfare economics both in 
theory and in practice.  However, expected utility theory does not always provide a reliable 
guide to individual human behaviour, and the derived social orderings may not accord with 
actual social preferences. 
Evidence from economics and psychology has raised questions about the rationality of 
actual decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Thaler, 2015), identifying situations in which 
expected utility theory fails to explain people’s behaviour.  Framing effects and preference 
reversals arise in quite simple settings and people consistently put more weight on potential 
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losses than on gains (Allais, 1953, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979).  For complex decisions, deviations from the expected utility theory are widespread (see 
e.g. Barberis and Thaler, 2003).  Valuation methods presuppose that choice-makers are fully 
aware of how alternative choices would influence their welfare. However, information and 
calculation requirements for ‘rational choice’ may be extensive, especially in environmental 
contexts where links from environmental change to human welfare are poorly understood, 
even by experts.  In some situations, individual preferences may be vague or simply ‘wrong’ 
in respect of welfare impacts.  For such ‘wicked’ problems, economic valuation estimates 
may be skewed, and cost-benefit analyses may not be a good guide to the relative desirability 
of outcomes. 
This might not matter if on average economic systems operate “as if” economic agents 
were rational utility maximizers (Friedman, 1953).  However, models built assuming such 
agents underplay or ignore human interactions, cognitive limitations, and biases and do not 
reliably predict the evolution of economies (Colander et al., 2009). Furthermore, even with 
the “as if” assumption, treating aggregate TEV as an index of social welfare involves two 
further assumptions: inter-personal comparability of utility (to aggregate preferences) and that 
underlying income distributions are socially acceptable. 
Despite the recognised problems, these assumptions may be an acceptable 
approximation.  Through market exchanges, our economic structures use these values, and 
tax/welfare policies redistribute incomes following democratic processes.  However, 
extending valuation and market framings to areas where market mechanisms and property 
rights have not been defined is ethically contentious and may have unintended consequences 
(Vatn, 2000; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010, Sullivan, 2013) in terms of fairness and behaviour.   
Environmental taxes tend to represent a greater proportion of income for poorer 
groups.  However the revenues raised could compensate for this, for example via reductions 
in other distortionary, regressive taxes (e.g. VAT, labour taxes).  It can also appear more 
‘efficient’ to cluster environmental ‘bads’ where people are poorer, because their WTP 
(constrained by income) is lower.  Valuation and appraisal can be adjusted via income 
weighting (rare) and/or use of average (mean or median) WTP values for whole populations 
(common), but full accounting for distributional impacts is rare and more attention might be 
given to this area.  
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‘Crowding out’ of non-market motives and values does occur where policy 
instruments introduce economic incentives and as a result modify people’s motivational 
structures (Rode et al., 2015).  But the use of monetary valuation in appraisal is a matter of 
framing benefits in a certain way, rather than any change in incentive structures, and so may 
be less likely to lead to crowding out of other arguments and motivations in deliberation 
(Tinch et al., 2018).  Furthermore, individual preferences and WTP can reflect other-
regarding values and moral norms, notably through non-use values. Using these values for 
social choice assumes that “the ecological, social and cultural dimensions of value can be both 
compared and compensated fully and justly” (Kenter et al., 2015) and that contentious issues 
regarding inter- and intra-generational equity are adequately resolved via assumptions about 
discounting and treatment of income distribution.  If individuals have context-specific 
values/preferences – values used in market exchange settings may be quite different from 
values used in group deliberation or public choice – the methods cannot give a single 
consistent ranking of policy alternatives (Kenter et al., 2015; Parks and Gowdy, 2013).  
However, this applies to all approaches, not just valuation17. 
Valuation assumes full knowledge about the ways changes in environmental goods 
and services influence utility functions.  But these linkages are often complex and poorly 
understood (Cardinale et al., 2012). There are many sources of complexity, variability, and 
uncertainty, both in bio-physical systems and in human preferences and technologies.  
resulting in accumulating uncertainty throughout stages of valuation.  There may be delays, 
threshold effects, and different impacts at various spatial and temporal scales (Muradian, 
2001, Kremen, 2005, Groffman et al., 2006).  Individuals are not risk-neutral regarding 
environmental outcomes, so recognising, communicating and treating uncertainty can lead to 
significantly different results in valuation studies (Faccioli et al., 2018).  The common 
practice of focusing on expected values can also be also problematic, especially where ‘fat 
tails’ of low-probability but highly damaging outcomes should motivate precautionary 
policies (Taleb, 2014, Weitzman, 2009). 
                                       
17 Arrow's impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1950) proves that for any method of aggregating individual 
preferences, individual preference patterns can exist such that it is impossible to derive a social ranking that 
meets minimal conditions of consistency, non-dictatorship, universality, monotonicity, and independence. 
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The value of a good or service can vary with its quantity and quality and hence most 
values represent a marginal value relating to a specific context. For many environmental 
services, demand can be quite ‘elastic’ at high levels of provision, but inelastic for lower 
levels, and effectively ‘infinite’ for essential services or ‘critical natural capital’ (see Chiesura 
and De Groot, 2003).  This puts limits on the applicability of valuation, with valuation 
relatively unproblematic under elastic demand, less reliable under inelastic demand, and not 
appropriate for critical capital. 
Coverage in any case is limited to the estimated part of total economic value, and in 
practice this rarely covers all sources of value, due to incompleteness of the evidence base 
linking environmental features to valuable services.  Critical elements of the natural 
environment may be overlooked in decision processes if they are not recognised as important. 
For example, we often underestimate the value of biodiversity and ecosystems by failing to 
account for the ways they support provision of food and water, and provide natural insurance 
to adapt to future conditions and shocks.  Again, this is a problem for decision support 
generally, not just valuation.  Primary research can help, but it is not always practical to wait 
until scientific uncertainty is resolved.  In most cases, it is necessary to take decisions under 
uncertainty, making best use of the information available.  Appraisal results should be tested 
for sensitivity to assumptions used, and any risks, uncertainties, missing data, and other 
caveats must be clearly and fully reported. 
Economists recognize all these issues, but use TEV and CBA for practical reasons: 
many of the objections can be adjusted for to some extent, and no approach is perfect.  A 
critical question is whether or not the evidence is actually useful, and this will depend on the 
deliberation and decision-making processes and the individuals involved.  Views differ 
widely.  Flyvbjerg (2009) argues that errors in forecasting are so substantial that CBA will 
almost always be “strongly misleading,” summarising this as “Garbage in, garbage out”.  
Conversely, Asplund and Eliasson (2016) conclude that, despite pervasive uncertainties, CBA 
“is able to fairly consistently separate the wheat from the chaff and hence contribute to 
substantially improved infrastructure decisions.”  eftec (2010b) reviewed the CBA of 
conservation projects, finding that, while there are few clear examples of “near-perfect” CBA 
studies, there are several examples that are “good enough” to provide a useful aid to decision 
making within a given context. 
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Other techniques exist that elicit different expressions of social preferences, including 
deliberative monetary valuation, ranking, participatory multi-criteria analysis, citizen juries, 
in-depth discussion groups, participatory modelling and mapping, and so on. These alternative 
decision support and/or valuation methods do not resolve all the concerns identified for 
valuation and CBA, and may introduce new ones, but can be useful in allowing different 
perspectives on social choice.  Alternative decision rules may for example prioritise 
precaution and robustness over maximisation of expected values.  In many cases these 
methods can be complementary to valuation and CBA, with evidence from several methods 
being incorporated within a wider deliberative process.  
It is widely recognised by economists (see e.g. TEEB, 2010, Diaz et al., 2018) that 
monetary valuation and cost benefit analysis only provide one form of evidence to support 
decision making, that should be used as a complement to ethical and scientific analyses, and 
consideration of various opinions relating to environmental exploitation and conservation.  
Monetary valuation, and decision support using it, should never be treated as the ‘right’ 
answer, nor as an alternative to deliberation.  Rather, valuation is a support to thinking about 
difficult decisions, and a way of summarising certain forms of information in a convenient 
and tractable fashion.  Of course there remains a risk of results being misused – for example 
being “cherry-picked” to support pre-determined conclusions – but this problem is hardly 
unique to valuation. 
6 Barriers and prospects for economic valuation  
Use of economic valuation to support decisions remains piecemeal.  Some argue that there are 
few clear examples of economic valuation having an influence (Laurans et al., 2013) and that 
ecosystem service information has yet to fundamentally change decision-making (Guerry et 
al., 2015, Ruckelshaus et al., 2015).  On the other hand the growing evidence base does 
appear to be encouraging policy responses (for example the UK 2011 White Paper “The 
natural choice: securing the value of nature” response to the National Ecosystem Assessment, 
and the European Commission’s Biodiversity Strategy commitments and related investments 
in the “Mapping and Assessment of Ecosystems and their Services” (MAES) initiative).  
Furthermore, valuation is only one aspect in a complex process and decision makers may have 
motives beyond the issues covered by valuation (Atkinson, 2015).  This can even make policy 
makers reluctant to use CBA at policy formation stages, since the results might not support 
their favoured policies (Pearce, 1998), with formal tools coming into play only later via 
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mandatory appraisals.  Similarly, Mackie et al. (2014) argue that CBA often enters the 
planning process too late to play any meaningful role.  This is particularly the case where 
planning processes are centred around a perceived “problem”: where the problem is seen as 
central and significant, even inefficient solutions may be viewed as “better than nothing”. 
This situation reflects a number of barriers to take-up of economic valuation for 
decision making.  Decision makers may focus on short-term more than long-term impacts, 
and may resist non-market valuation because it is perceived as less reliable than estimates of 
project costs (Barton, 2007) or market benefits.  Formal appraisal tools (mostly CBA) are 
widely used, but often focus on direct costs to industry (Nilsson et al 2008).  Although 
decision makers are increasingly aware of non-market costs and benefits, they often lack 
expertise or support needed to apply values in appraisals.  Official guidelines such as the UK 
public sector “Green Book” (HMT, 2018 and supporting documents) help address this, though 
many countries lack guidelines.  But even in the impact assessments of the UK Government, 
quantification and monetisation of ecosystem services remain rare: while carbon emissions 
and air pollution are commonly valued (following clear guidance), changes in the ecosystem 
services of climate regulation or air pollution regulation are less commonly reported or valued 
(eftec and Cascade, 2014).  There is, as yet, no standardised approach for the private sector – 
although this is changing, for example via the Natural Capital Committee publications 
(including the ‘how to’ guide)18, United Nations System of Environmental Economic 
Accounting (UN SEEA) guidelines19 and the Natural Capital Protocol20.  
Although there remain gaps in the valuation evidence base, these are gradually being 
filled, and valuation databases such as EVRI and TEEB contain thousands of studies.21  As 
the number and impact of economic and environmental trade-offs are expected to grow, it is 
reasonable to expect continued theoretical development and application of robust and varied 
economic valuation technique in an increasingly diverse set of situations, as part of a broader 
policy analysis and decision support system (Turner, 2007).  Wider use of economic valuation 
is occurring as a product of efforts to “mainstream” environmental concerns across all sectors. 
                                       
18 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/natural-capital-committee  
19 https://seea.un.org/  
20 https://naturalcapitalcoalition.org/  
21 www.evri.ca; https://www.es-partnership.org/services/data-knowledge-sharing/ecosystem-service-valuation-
database/  
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Researchers have recognised the challenges of communicating environmental priorities to 
policy makers in sectors that depend on and/or influence ecosystems, especially in the face of 
political agendas and private interests that have prioritised short-term growth and employment 
over longer-term concerns.  They have responded with initiatives aiming to help ensure that 
environmental concerns are taken into account alongside economic and social priorities, 
leading to increasing use of economic valuation concepts in a wide range of policies and 
research initiatives at both national and international levels.  For example, economic analysis 
was explicitly included in the EU Water Framework Directive (see eftec, 2010c). The 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Aichi Targets and the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 
2020 (EUBS) both include targets and actions relating specifically to mainstreaming 
biodiversity values across government and society, promoting awareness of the economic 
values of biodiversity and ecosystems, and incorporating these values in accounting and 
reporting systems.22  
Meanwhile, work has advanced on natural capital accounting, in particular through the 
United Nations Statistics Division, the European Environment Agency and the World Bank 
Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES)23 global partnership. The 
UN SEEA uses concepts, definitions and classifications consistent with the System of 
National Accounts (SNA) to facilitate integration of environmental and economic statistics, 
and is an international standard24. Full ecosystem accounting, including most accounting for 
biodiversity, comes under the SEEA Experimental Ecosystem Accounts, which is not (yet) a 
standard and is at the stage of further development and testing, e.g. in Europe (Weber, 2011) 
and the UK (ONS, 2018).  Further moves to mainstreaming valuation are evident in the 
development of ISO 14007 and 14008 as noted above. 
7 Conclusion 
Monetary arguments for recognising the relative importance of different forms of natural 
capital and processes may not be to everyone’s taste, but this framing can be useful and 
convincing for some decision makers. For others, initial mistrust of unfamiliar methods can 
give way to active demand for monetary evidence (e.g. Mathieu et al., 2016).  Some reject 
                                       
22 Aichi targets 1 and 2, EUBS action 5. 
23 http://www.wavespartnership.org/en  
24 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp  
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monetary valuation “on principle” (e.g. McCauley, 2006), but, as Mace (2014) argues, “if the 
benefits provided by nature are assigned no value, they are treated as having no value, and 
current trends in the decline and deterioration of natural systems will continue.”  In her 
proposed “people and nature” framing for conservation, there is space for economic and 
monetary arguments alongside considerations of resilience, adaptability and the complex 
interdependencies of human and natural systems. 
This flexibility can be central to keeping environmental issues in the mainstream of 
decision processes.  For example, at the European level, the priority accorded to economic 
growth and employment under the Lisbon Strategy, coupled with the perception that 
environmental concerns are in opposition to growth, jobs and competitiveness, has created a 
serious challenge for environmental protection.  In response, there has been growing emphasis 
on concepts such as the Circular Economy, Green Economy, green infrastructure, natural 
capital, and nature-based solutions, and a corresponding shift in language and arguments for 
environmental protection, with greater use of economic and monetary arguments for raising 
awareness and tracking performance (Tinch et al., 2015).  At the launch of the 2020 
biodiversity strategy, the European Parliament rapporteur stated ‘each year we lose 3% of 
GDP due to the loss of biodiversity. That costs the EU €450 billion year after year. Compared 
to these figures, investing €5.8 billion per year in Natura 2000 is a bargain!’25 
Monetary valuation is not essential: there are alternative ways of carrying out 
appraisal (Multi criteria analysis, collective decision and other forms of deliberation 
methods), and even market-based instruments could be implemented without valuation.  
However, valuation can contribute to improving decisions, helping ensure that environmental 
concerns are taken fully into account on a “level playing field” with economic and social 
concerns, even in sectors not primarily focused on conservation.   
Valuation is not a replacement for deliberation, but rather part of it, offering a particular 
way of examining the efficiency and distributional impacts of alternative uses of resources, 
and making deliberative processes easier, more efficient, and more transparent and replicable.  
In this light, it is encouraging to note the ongoing development of improved valuation 
methods and a richer evidence base, alongside growing private and public sector interest in 
                                       
25 Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (ALDE, NL).  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/2020.htm  
25 
incorporating natural capital and environmental flows in project appraisal and accounting 
processes. 
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Figure 1: The Total Economic Value framework  
Source: adapted from Pascual et al., 2015.  
 
